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LAW SCHOOL 
 
885 Centre Street 
Newton, MA 02459 
617-552-2927 (direct dial) 
patricia.mccoy@bc.edu 
November 19, 2018 
 
 
Comment of Legal Scholars on Docket ID OCC-2018-0008 
 
Submitted electronically 
 
Legislative and Regulatory Activities Division 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 
400 7th Street, S.W. 
Suite 3E-218 
Washington, D.C. 20219 
 
Dear Sir or Madam:   
 
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the advance notice of proposed rulemaking 
(ANPR) titled “Reforming the Community Reinvestment Act Regulatory Framework,” Docket 
ID OCC-2018-0008.  We are legal scholars specializing in financial regulation and its effect on 
reinvestment in underserved communities.*   
 
In this ANPR,1 the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) invites public comment on 
potential revisions to the rule implementing the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA).2  The 
stakes of this ANPR are high, because of the positive effect this landmark piece of legislation has 
had on revitalizing America’s distressed neighborhoods and communities.3  As the OCC 
                                                 
*  Our affiliations are for identification only and do not necessarily represent the views of Boston College.   
1  Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Reforming the Community Reinvestment Act Regulatory 
Framework:  Advance notice of proposed rulemaking, 83 Fed. Reg. 45053 (Sept. 5, 2018) [hereinafter ANPR]. 
2  12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2908. 
3  See, e.g., Eric Belsky, Michael Schill & Anthony Yezer, The Effect of the Community Reinvestment Act on 
Bank and Thrift Home Mortgage Lending (Joint Center for Housing Studies of Harvard University 2001); Raphael 
Bostic & Hyojung Lee, Small Business Lending Under the Community Reinvestment Act, 19 CITYSCAPE:  A 
JOURNAL OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND RESEARCH 63, 64-65 (2017) (reviewing literature); Lei Ding & Leonard 
Nakamura, “Don’t Know What You Got Till It’s Gone” – The Effects of the Community Investment Act on Mortgage 
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contemplates amendments to the CRA rule, we urge it to build on this success by preserving 
CRA’s traditional emphasis on local communities while expanding CRA to address new ways of 
banking.   
 
More than two decades have elapsed since the major 1995 rule4 that revamped the examination 
criteria for CRA to reward performance over documentation and effort.  Under the 1995 rule, as 
amended, federal banking regulators evaluate an insured depository’s CRA performance based 
on its delineated assessment area or areas, which are defined according to where the bank5 has its 
main office, branches, automated teller machines (ATMs), and certain surrounding areas.   
 
Since that time, technological and legal developments have allowed banking to transcend its 
former geographical boundaries.  Online and mobile banking allows customers to transact 
business in the virtual world and some banks have no branches at all.  The old barriers to 
interstate banking fell following the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act.6  Meanwhile, the consumer lending operations of many banks serve 
far-flung states outside their branch networks and CRA assessment areas. 
 
It would be a mistake to conclude from these developments, however, that brick-and-mortar 
bank branches are a thing of the past.  As we explain in Section II.A below, depositors continue 
to rely heavily on bank branches.  That fact, combined with the CRA’s express statutory 
directives, needs to inform any revisions to the CRA rule going forward.  If the CRA rule is 
amended, it should be done in such a way to maintain banks’ responsiveness to the communities 
served by their branches and ATMs, while also evaluating retail activities of banks outside their 
branch networks.  This additive approach recognizes current banking developments while 
honoring the statutory language of and Congress’ intent behind the Community Reinvestment 
Act. 
 
I. The Statutory Language of the Community Reinvestment Act 
 
Any analysis of the Community Reinvestment Act starts with the statute’s words.  As its central 
command, CRA charges each Federal financial supervisory agency as follows:7 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
Lending in the Philadelphia Market (Fed. Res. Bank Phila. Working Paper 17-15, 2017); John Fitzgerald & Samuel 
P. Vitello, Impacts of the Community Reinvestment Act on Neighborhood Change and Gentrification, 24 HOUSING 
POLICY DEBATE 446 (2014) (reviewing literature); Daniel Ringo, Mortgage Lending, Default, and the Community 
Reinvestment Act (Fed. Res. Bd., June 15, 2017). 
4  60 Fed. Reg. 22156 (May 4, 1995).   In 2005, the OCC, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation adopted a joint final rule liberalizing the examination 
criteria for intermediate small banks (with total assets of between $250 million and $1 billion, adjusted annually for 
inflation).  Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, Joint final rule of the O.C.C, Federal Reserve System, and the 
F.D.I.C., 70 Fed. Reg. 44256 (2005). 
5  In this comment, we use the word “bank” to refer to any type of insured depository institution.  See 12 
U.S.C. §§ 2901(a), 2902(2), 2903(c)(3)(C) (applying CRA to “regulated financial institutions” and defining them as 
“insured depository institutions,” as defined in 12 U.S.C. § 1813(c)(2)). 
6  Pub. L. No. 103-328, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994). 
7  12 U.S.C. § 2903(a).  CRA defines the “appropriate Federal financial supervisory agencies” as the OCC, 
the Federal Reserve Board, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.  Id. § 2902(1).  In this letter, we refer to 
these three agencies as the “federal banking regulators.” 
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(a)  IN GENERAL  In connection with its examination of a financial institution, the 
appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency shall— 
 
(1) Assess the institution’s record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, 
including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and 
sound operation of such institution; and 
(2) Take such record into account in its evaluation of an application for a deposit 
facility by such institution. 
 
Other provisions of CRA elaborate on the meaning of this provision. 
 
On reading CRA in its entirety, three statutory directives stand out.  First, Congress, in CRA, tied 
the obligation of banks to serve the credit needs of their communities to the physical geographies 
where their deposit facilities are located.  Second, serving the convenience and needs of 
communities includes providing both deposit services and credit services.  Finally, CRA 
expressly requires serving the needs of low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods, 
consistent with safety and soundness. 
 
A. Directive One:  CRA Requires Service to Physical Neighborhoods and Communities 
Surrounding Branch Networks 
 
The statutory language of CRA makes clear that Congress expected banks to serve the 
convenience and needs of the physical neighborhoods and communities that surround their 
branches and ATMs.  This appears clearly in the part of CRA that requires federal banking 
regulators to evaluate each bank’s CRA performance “separately for each metropolitan area in 
which a [bank] maintains one or more domestic branch offices.”8  Similarly, CRA’s findings 
expressly state that “regulated financial institutions are required by law to demonstrate that their 
deposit facilities serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are chartered 
to do business.”9  As this reference to “deposit facilities” indicates, the express text of CRA 
establishes that banks owe their core CRA obligations to the areas served by their branches and 
ATMs.   
 
Other provisions in CRA buttress the conclusion that banks must serve the credit and deposit 
needs of the physical areas surrounding their branches.  For example, Congress emphasized a 
focus on place when it told federal banking regulators to “encourage” banks “to help meet the 
credit needs of the local communities in which they are chartered consistent with the safe and 
sound operation of such institutions.”10  The words “local communities” underscore CRA’s non-
negotiable command to serve the physical areas and surrounding geographies where a bank’s 
branches and ATMs are found.  In another provision, Congress allowed any bank that 
                                                 
8  Id. § 2906(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added).  Accord, id. § 2906(d) (describing the method of CRA evaluation for 
banks that maintain “domestic branches in 2 or more States . . .”).  CRA defines “domestic branch” to mean “any 
branch office or other facility of a regulated financial institution that accepts deposits, located in any State.”  Id. § 
2906(e)(1). 
9  Id. § 2901(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
10  Id. § 2901(b) (emphasis added).  Accord, id. § 2903(b) (allowing CRA credit for investments in minority- 
and women-owned banks, “provided that these activities help meet the credit needs of local communities in which 
such institutions and credit unions are chartered”) (emphasis added). 
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predominantly serves members of the military “who are not located within a defined geographic 
area” to define its “entire community” to include “its entire deposit customer base without 
regard to geographic proximity.”11  By negative implication, this provision requires other banks 
to define their assessment areas in terms of “geographic proximity” to their deposit customer 
bases and assumes that those customer bases are located “within a defined geographic area” or 
areas.12   
 
Together, these provisions make abundantly clear that banks must serve the local neighborhoods 
and communities where their branches are located.  CRA does not preclude giving credit for 
serving other communities that are outside of banks’ branch networks.  However, banks that 
have branches cannot receive CRA credit unless they first discharge their core responsibility to 
serve areas in “geographic proximity” to their branches. 
 
B. Directive Two: Serving the Convenience and Needs of Communities Includes Both 
Deposit Services and Credit Services  
 
CRA establishes a general duty on the part of depository institutions to “serve the convenience 
and needs of the communities in which they are chartered to do business.”13  The statute then 
defines “the convenience and needs of communities” to include “the need for credit services as 
well as deposit services.”14 Consequently, offering both types of services is necessary to fulfill a 
bank’s CRA commitment. 
 
C. Directive Three:  CRA Requires Banks to Serve the Needs of Low- and Moderate- 
Income Neighborhoods  
 
Finally, service to the low- and moderate-income (LMI) segment of communities is intrinsic to 
every bank’s CRA commitment.  This appears in CRA’s language that directs federal banking 
regulators to assess each institution’s record “of meeting the credit needs of its entire 
community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods, consistent with the safe and 
sound operation of such institution . . .”15   
 
                                                 
11  Id. § 2902(4) (emphasis added). 
12  Elsewhere, CRA directs federal banking regulators to examine the record of banks in serving “low- and 
moderate-income neighborhoods,” id. § 2903(a)(1) (emphasis added), demonstrating again that CRA’s core 
commands require service to real neighborhoods with streets and physical addresses.  Accord, id. § 2906(a)(1) 
(requiring federal banking regulators to prepare written evaluations of each bank’s “record of meeting the credit 
needs of its entire community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods”) (emphasis added). 
13  12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1). 
14  Id. § 2901(a)(2). 
15  Id. § 2903(a)(1) (emphasis added).  See also id. § 2906(a)(1) (requiring federal banking regulators to 
prepare written examination reports of each institution’s “record of meeting the credit needs of its entire community, 
including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods”) (emphasis added); id. § 2903(d) (instructing federal banking 
regulators, during their CRA examination of each bank, to “consider, as a factor, low-cost education loans provided 
by the financial institution to low-income borrowers”) (emphasis added). 
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CRA’s emphasis on LMI neighborhoods is a response to historic redlining and seeks to correct 
the market imperfections that lead to disinvestment in those neighborhoods.16  Lending, by 
definition, involves predictions about the risk of default and collection.  In poorer 
neighborhoods, it may be more expensive for conventional lenders to distinguish between low-
risk and high-risk borrowers.  Often, loan officers are unfamiliar with the profit-making 
opportunities in poor communities because they do not live in those communities and come from 
more affluent and privileged social milieus.  Greater outreach and education may be needed to 
reach potential borrowers.  Loans may require greater monitoring in order to assure repayment.  
Borrowers who in fact are creditworthy may not be able to satisfy conventional underwriting 
criteria, such as long employment with one employer, stable residence at one address, prior 
credit history, etc.  Because loans in such neighborhoods tend to be smaller, moreover, the fixed 
costs of community reinvestment loans may have to be spread over a smaller potential return.17   
 
To compound matters, as lenders shun poor neighborhoods, information costs rise.  By necessity, 
current appraisals, which are crucial to evaluating collateral, must be based on prior sales.  If 
house sales in a neighborhood drop due to a lender=s refusal to lend, there will be fewer sales to 
provide a yardstick for future appraisals.  Appraisals will become less and less reliable and 
lenders will become even more reluctant to lend, triggering a downward spiral in investment.18 
 
Without investment, properties in LMI neighborhoods will continue to deteriorate, spawning 
negative externalities that will discourage loans throughout the neighborhoods, no matter how 
sterling an individual borrower or property.  If a neighborhood is in physical decline, a lender 
may decline to lend even where the collateral supports the loan, because future deterioration in 
the neighborhood could cause collateral values to fall. The result can be a self-fulfilling 
prophecy, as one reluctant lender makes other creditors reluctant to lend and more and more 
properties fall into disrepair due to paucity of rehabilitation loans.19 
 
One way to reverse the problem of information costs in lending is through coordination among 
lenders.  However, such coordination may be illegal and, at a minimum, is legally risky due to 
antitrust concerns.30  As with cartels, moreover, coordination creates inherent incentives to cheat 
that make coordination unstable over time.31  Another approach would be to foster specialized 
                                                 
16  See notes 37-49 infra and accompanying text.  This analysis of disinvestment is excerpted from PATRICIA 
A. MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL REGULATION OF FINANCIAL HOLDING COMPANIES, BANKS AND 
THRIFTS § 8.04 (Lexis 2d ed. 2000 & 2014 cum. supp.). 
17  See, e.g., Michael S. Barr, Access to Financial Services in the 21st Century: Five Opportunities for the Bush 
Administration and the 107th Congress, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L., ETHICS & PUB. POL=Y 447, 534-44 (2002); Michael 
Klausner, Market Failure and Community Investment: A Market-Oriented Alternative to the Community 
Reinvestment Act, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 1561, 1568 (1995); Christopher A. Richardson, The Community Reinvestment 
Act and the Economics of Regulatory Policy, 29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1607, 1614-16 (2002); Peter P. Swire, The 
Persistent Problem of Lending Discrimination: A Law and Economics Analysis, 73 TEX. L. REV. 787, 818-19 
(1995). 
18  See Klausner, supra note 17, at 1569-70. 
19  See Barr, supra note 17, at 540; Keith N. Hylton & Vincent D. Rougeau, Lending Discrimination: 
Economic Theory, Econometric Evidence, and the Community Reinvestment Act, 85 GEO. L.J.  237, 256-67 (1996); 
Klausner, supra note 17, at 1570-71; Lawrence J. White, The Community Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions 
Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 281, 284-85 (1993). 
30 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 19, at 257; White, supra note 19, at 285. 
31 See Hylton & Rougeau, supra note 19, at 257-58; Klausner, supra note 17, at 1577. 
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markets in which a handful of lenders specialize in loans to poor neighborhoods, thereby 
developing sufficient expertise and market share to make those loans economically profitable.  
Tragically, however, this market materialized disastrously in the form of subprime mortgage 
lending, which triggered the 2008 financial crisis and high rates of foreclosure.20   
 
In sum, reliance on private solutions to the collective action problems posed by disinvestment 
has proven unworkable at best and catastrophic at worst.  CRA fills this vacuum in important 
ways, by reducing the information costs of healthy credit in LMI neighborhoods.  In the process, 
CRA has helped reverse the added negative externalities that flow from disinvestment and 
revitalize our nation’s urban cores.      
 
-------------------------------- 
 
In sum, CRA’s three statutory directives, when read together, establish the threshold 
requirements that every bank must meet to satisfy its CRA obligations.  These requirements are 
as follows and frame the content of any amendments to the rule implementing CRA: 
 
(1) Banks must serve the convenience and needs of the geographic areas surrounding 
their brick-and-mortar branch offices and ATMs; 
(2) Serving the convenience and needs means providing both deposit services and credit 
services; and 
(3) Banks must serve low- and moderate-income neighborhoods in order to serve 
convenience and needs. 
 
II. Response to the ANPR 
 
The three statutory directives of CRA – serving local communities, providing deposit and credit 
services, and emphasizing services to LMI neighborhoods – are the sine qua non of any future 
revisions to the CRA rule.  In this section, we describe in greater detail how these three 
directives frame the contours of any future CRA rule.  In the course of our discussion, we will 
also respond to key issues posed by the ANPR.   
 
First, though, we wish to applaud the OCC’s ANPR for taking the values reflected by CRA’s 
directives seriously.   The ANPR contains a valuable description of recent market developments 
as well as a number of good ideas.  In other respects, the ANPR handles certain issues in ways 
that pose concerns.  We turn to these topics now. 
 
A. Any New Rule Must Keep CRA’s Focus on Local Communities 
 
Our review of CRA’s statutory requirements leads to the inescapable conclusion that service to 
local communities must be the core focus of every bank’s CRA evaluation.  In CRA, Congress 
required banks to serve the convenience and needs of the neighborhoods and communities 
surrounding their brick-and-mortar branches and ATMs.  Any amendment to the CRA rule must 
                                                 
20  Federal banking regulators have been reluctant to award CRA credit for subprime mortgage loans.  Darryl 
E. Getter, The Effectiveness of the Community Reinvestment Act 10-12 (Cong. Research Serv. Report No. 7-5700, 
Jan. 7, 2015). 
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observe this requirement. 
 
We appreciate, of course, that the business of banking has exceeded the old geographic 
boundaries of banks to an extent that was unimaginable to Congress when it enacted CRA in 
1977.  At the same time, brick-and-mortar branches remain indispensable to bank customers.  
Indeed, just last month, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) reported that almost 
three-fourths of banked households surveyed in 2017 had “used bank tellers to access their 
accounts in the past 12 months.”21  More depositors used bank tellers than any other method of 
accessing their transaction accounts, including automated teller machines (ATMs) or kiosks, 
telephone banking, online banking, and mobile banking.22  This is not surprising because 
branches and ATMs are the main way customers deposit checks and withdraw cash.  Branches 
are also where bank customers generally go when they want personal banking services.  
Conversely, branches are the place where the loan officers of the bank come to know specific 
communities and neighborhoods. 
 
Given these modern realities and the statutory text of CRA, any new rule will need to strike a 
proper balance between the geographic expansion of banks’ activities beyond their branch 
networks and a locally-based approach to CRA.  The way to do this is to make any new CRA 
rule additive in nature.  Under that approach, every bank with branches would have a core 
responsibility to serve the convenience and needs of the neighborhoods and communities in 
geographic proximity to their branches and ATMs.  Once that duty was fulfilled, banks could 
receive extra credit for other CRA activities outside of those locales, whether those activities 
take place in other states or in the virtual context.  In this way, a new CRA rule would fulfill 
CRA’s statutory requirements while encouraging CRA service in other underserved geographies.  
Any other approach would pose the danger of inadvertently rewarding banks for branch closures, 
which would be highly damaging to LMI communities. 
 
B. Serving the Convenience and Needs of Customers Located Beyond the Current 
Assessment Areas  
 
CRA’s text is similarly instructive about how and when to grant credit for CRA activities beyond 
a bank’s branch footprint.  The statute requires federal banking regulators to evaluate a bank’s 
CRA performance based on its service to low- and moderate-income neighborhoods and 
communities.  Accordingly, serving LMI communities and households should be the goal of any 
new approach to CRA credit for activities outside of a bank’s current assessment areas. 
 
Today, the banking landscape features a number of new business models that did not exist in 
1977, when CRA was enacted.  Many medium-sized and larger banks have hybrid models, with 
branch networks in some areas but loan production elsewhere.  Other banks maintain branches in 
defined areas but offer expanded geographic coverage through online or mobile banking.  At the 
far end of the technological spectrum, purely online banks have no physical presence except for 
their headquarters and instead conduct their retail business online or through mobile apps.  
Industry loan companies and wholesale banks also often conduct far-flung operations from a 
                                                 
21  Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, FDIC National Survey of Unbanked and Underbanked Households 
25 (2018), https://www.fdic.gov/householdsurvey/2017/2017report.pdf [hereinafter FDIC Unbanked Study]. 
22  Id. at 25-26 & tbl. 4.2. 
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s m all g e o gr a p hi c b as e. 
 
A n y n e w r ul e t h at gi v es cr e dit f or C R A a cti viti es o utsi d e of t h e tr a diti o n al ass ess m e nt ar e as 
s urr o u n di n g br a n c h es a n d A T M s s h o ul d pl a c e t o p pri orit y o n s er vi c e t o L MI n ei g h b or h o o ds, 
c o m m u niti es, a n d i n di vi d u als.  I n p arti c ul ar, b a n ks s h o ul d b e r e w ar d e d f or e xt e n di n g s er vi c e t o 
L MI ar e as a n d f a mili es t h at h a v e b e e n u n d ers er v e d.  T h es e ar e j ust s o m e of t h e ar e as of n e e d i n 
L MI c o m m u niti es t h at C R A c o ul d a d dr ess: 
 
•  T h e s o- c all e d “ b a n ki n g d es erts ”:  B a n ki n g d es erts ar e g e o gr a p hi c ar e as t h at s uff er fr o m 
i n a d e q u at e b a n k s er vi c e.2 3   S o m e b a n ki n g d es erts l a c k e n o u g h i n v est m e nt i n c o m m u nit y 
d e v el o p m e nt; ot h ers h a v e a p a u cit y of b a n k br a n c h es a n d ar e pr e d o mi n at e d b y fri n g e 
b a n ki n g pr o vi d ers s u c h a s c h e c k c as h ers a n d p a y d a y l e n d ers.   A n a bs e n c e of b a n k 
br a n c h es c a n c a us e b a n ki n g d es erts t o f all o utsi d e of tr a diti o n al C R A ass ess m e nt ar e as 
a n d es c a p e C R A c o v er a g e.   
 
B a n ks s h o ul d b e r e w ar d e d u n d er C R A f or s e ar c hi n g o ut b a n ki n g d es erts a n d pr o vi di n g 
t h e m wit h b a n k s er vi c es.  B a n ki n g d es erts pr es e nt pri m e o p p ort u niti es t o e x p a n d d e p osit-
t a ki n g, i n cl u di n g t hr o u g h i n n o v ati v e c h a n n els s u c h as m o bil e b a n ki n g.  B a n k d es erts 
oft e n off er pr ofit a bl e l e n di n g a n d ot h er i n v est m e nt o p p ort u niti es t h at h a v e b e e n 
o v erl o o k e d.  A c c or di n gl y, t h es e ar e as ar e ri p e wit h o p p ort u niti es t o f ulfill C R A’s 
m a n d at e t o pr o vi d e b ot h d e p osit a n d cr e dit s er vi c e s. 
 
•  B a n ki n g t h e u n b a n k e d:  I n 2 0 1 7, a n esti m at e d 6. 5 % of U. S. h o us e h ol ds w er e u n b a n k e d 
b e c a us e t h e y di d n ot h a v e a d e p osit a c c o u nt. 2 4   A n u p d at e d C R A r ul e c o ul d h el p a d dr ess 
t his pr o bl e m b y gi vi n g C R A cr e dit t o b a n ks f or s u c c essf ull y assisti n g u n b a n k e d 
h o us e h ol ds t o o p e n b a n k a c c o u nts.    
 
Attr a cti n g t h e u n b a n k e d i nt o t h e b a n ki n g s yst e m pr es e nts a s p e ci al o p p ort u nit y f or b a n ks 
t h at off er m o bil e b a n ki n g, gi v e n t h e r a pi d gr o wt h i n m o bil e b a n ki n g i n r e c e nt y e ars.2 5   
T h e  e x p eri e n c e wit h “ u n d er b a n k e d ” c ust o m ers s u g g ests t h at m o bil e b a n ki n g h as 
u nt a p p e d p ot e nti al f or r e cr uiti n g u n b a n k e d c ust o m ers t o o p e n b a n k a c c o u nts.  
H o us e h ol ds t h at ar e u n d er b a n k e d — m e a ni n g t h at t h e y h a v e tr a ns a cti o n a c c o u nts b ut als o 
us e o n e or m or e fri n g e b a n ki n g s er vi c es — us e m o bil e b a n ki n g at a hi g h er r at e t h a n f ull y 
b a n k e d h o us e h ol ds. 2 6   T h es e u n d er b a n k e d h o us e h ol ds ar e pr e d o mi n a ntl y l o w- or 
m o d er at e-i n c o m e, as is tr u e f or t h e u n b a n k e d. 2 7   T o g et h er, t h es e f a cts s u g g est t h at m o bil e 
b a n ki n g c o ul d pr o vi d e a us ef ul p oi nt of e ntr y t o a ssist t h e u n b a n k e d t o b e c o m e p art of t h e 
b a n ki n g s yst e m. 
 
                                                 
2 3   S e e, e. g., D o n al d M or g a n, M a xi m Pi n k o vs ki y & Br y a n Y a n g, B a n ki n g D e s e rts, B r a n c h Cl o si n g s a n d S oft 
I nf o r m ati o n, LI B E R T Y S T R E E T E C O N O MI C S  bl o g ( M ar c h 7, 2 0 1 5). 
2 4    F DI C U n b a n k e d St u d y, su p r a n ot e 2 1, at 2 t bl. E S. 1. 
2 5    T h e p er c e nt a g e of h o u s e h ol d s usi n g m o bil e b a n ki n g j u m p e d fr o m 2 3. 2 % i n 2 0 1 3 t o 4 0. 4 % i n 2 0 1 7.  I d. at 5 
t bl. E S. 3. 
2 6   I d. a t 2 7 t bl. 4. 4 
2 7   S e e i d. a t 1 9- 2 0 t bls. 3. 2- 3. 3. 
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•  H el pi n g L MI f a mili es b uil d s a vi n gs:  I n 2 0 1 7, f o ur o ut of t e n U. S. a d ults r e p ort e d t h at 
t h e y di d n ot h a v e e n o u g h m o n e y t o p a y f or a $ 4 0 0 u n e x p e ct e d e x p e ns e.2 8   T his l a c k of 
e m er g e n c y s a vi n gs b e c o m es i n cr e asi n gl y pr e v al e nt as o n e g o es d o w n t h e i n c o m e 
s p e ctr u m. 2 9   E v e n m o d est a m o u nts of s a vi n gs c o ul d n oti c e a bl y i m pr o v e t h e fi n a n ci al 
s ec urit y of t h es e f a mili es w hil e h el pi n g t h e m a v oi d g etti n g s a d dl e d wit h d e bt.  B a n ks t h at 
h el p L MI f a mili es i n b uil di n g s a vi n gs w o ul d h el p a d dr ess t his pr o bl e m a n d s h o ul d b e 
r e w ar d e d wit h C R A cr e dit. 
 
•  R ur al ar e as :  C R A t ells f e d er al b a n ki n g r e g ul at ors t o c o n d u ct s e p ar at e C R A a n al ys es 
“f or e a c h m etr o p olit a n ar e a i n w hi c h a r e g ul at e d d e p osit or y i nstit uti o n m ai nt ai ns o n e or 
m or e d o m esti c br a n c h offi c es. ” 3 0   T his f o c us o n m etr o p olit a n ar e as tr a diti o n all y h as 
c a us e d m a n y r ur al ar e as t o b e o mitt e d fr o m C R A ass ess m e nt ar e as. B ot h of us c o m e fr o m 
f a mili es i n l ar g el y r ur al st at es – K a ns as a n d L o uisi a n a – a n d w e h a v e s e e n first- h a n d t h e 
p o v ert y a n d l a c k of b a n k s er vi c es a n d i n v est m e nt i n r ur al c o m m u niti es.  If C R A cr e dit is 
e x p a n d e d b e y o n d t h e c urr e nt tr a diti o n al ass ess m e nt ar e as, s er vi c e t o r ur al ar e as s h o ul d b e 
r e w ar d e d. 
 
I n c o n cl usi o n, a n y a m e n d m e nt t o t h e st a n d ar d f or e v al u ati n g C R A p erf or m a n c e b y b a n ks s h o ul d 
c o n diti o n C R A cr e dit f or a cti viti es o utsi d e of a b a n k’s tr a diti o n al ass ess m e nt ar e as o n 
s atisf a ct or y s er vi c e t o t h e n ei g h b or h o o ds a n d c o m m u niti es a dj a c e nt t o t h eir br a n c h es.  Ass u mi n g 
t h e b a n k h as f ulfill e d t his c or e r es p o nsi bilit y u n d er C R A, w e w o ul d s u p p ort e xtr a cr e dit f or 
q u alif yi n g C R A a cti viti e s i n ot h er g e o gr a p hi es, s o l o n g as t h e o bj e cti v e of t h os e a cti viti es is t o 
s er v e l o w- a n d m o d er at e-i n c o m e n ei g h b or h o o ds, c o m m u niti es, a n d f a mili es.   
 
C.  A Si n gl e C R A R ati o 
 
I n t h e A N P R, t h e O C C eli cit e d c o m m e nt o n w h et h er t h e a g e n c y s h o ul d cr e at e a m etri c- b as e d 
p erf or m a n c e m e as ur e m e nt s yst e m t h at a g gr e g at es a n i nstit uti o n’s C R A l e n di n g, i n v est m e nts, a n d 
s er vi c es i nt o a si n gl e r ati o. 3 1   T h e A N P R st at es:  “I n a m etri c- b as e d fr a m e w or k . . . t h e 
b e n c h m ar ks r e pr es e nti n g t h e d oll ar v al u e of C R A- q u alifi e d a cti viti es c o ul d b e c o m p ar e d t o 
r e a dil y a v ail a bl e a n d o bj e cti v e crit eri a, s u c h as, a p er c e nt a g e of d o m esti c a ss ets, d e p osits, or 
c a pit al fr o m t h e b a n k’s b al a n c e s h e et, t o c al c ul at e a r ati o t h at c o ul d c orr es p o n d t o t h e b e n c h m ar k 
est a blis h e d f or e a c h r ati n g c at e g or y. ” 3 2   F or e a c h b a n k, s u c h a r ati o w o ul d l o o k li k e t his: 
 
T ot al C R A l e n di n g + t ot al C R A i n v est m e nts + t ot al C R A s er vi c es 
B al a n c e s h e et m e as ur e ( eit h er t ot al ass ets, d e p osits, or c a pit al) 
 
                                                 
2 8   S e e B O A R D O F G O V E R N O R S O F T H E F E D E R A L R E S E R V E S Y S T E M , R E P O R T O N T H E E C O N O MI C W E L L - BEI N G 
O F  U. S.  H O U S E H O L D S I N 2 0 1 7, at 2 1 ( M a y 2 0 1 8), htt p s:// w w w.f e d er alr e s er v e. g o v/ p u bli c ati o ns/fil e s/ 2 0 1 7-r e p ort-
e c o n o mi c- w ell- b ei n g- us- h o us e h ol d s- 2 0 1 8 0 5. p df. 
2 9   S e e F DI C U n b a n k e d St u d y, s u p r a n ot e 2 1, at 4 4 t bl. 7. 1. 
3 0    1 2 U. S. C. § 2 9 0 6( b)( 1)( B). 
3 1    U n d er t h e c urr e nt C R A r ul e, s m all b a n ks o nl y u n d er g o a l e n di n g t e st.  I nt er m e di at e s m all b a n ks ar e als o 
e v al u at e d o n t h e e xt e nt a n d q u alit y of t h eir c o m m u nit y d e v el o p m e nt a cti viti e s, w hil e l ar g e b a n ks ar e a s s e s s e d u n d er 
t h e l e n di n g, i n v e st m e nt, a n d s er vi c e s t e sts.  A N P R, s u p r a n ot e 1, at 4 5 0 5 5.   
3 2   I d. at 4 5 0 5 7. 
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We have a number of grave concerns about reducing a bank’s CRA evaluation and rating to one 
number.   
 
The first concern is legal.  As mentioned above, CRA expressly requires federal banking 
regulators to evaluate a bank’s CRA performance “for each metropolitan area in which” it 
“maintains one or more domestic branch offices.”33   The single ratio formula above does not 
account for individual metropolitan area performance; indeed, it does not even mention it.34  
Thus, for banks operating in multiple metropolitan areas, any switch to a single ratio method 
would violate CRA’s statutory requirement to evaluate CRA performance one metropolitan area 
at a time. 
 
This problem is more than just a legal concern.  One of the reasons that Congress required 
federal banking regulators to evaluate CRA performance for each metropolitan area where a 
bank has branches is to ensure that banks make CRA commitments to each of the communities 
where they have offices.  A single ratio test would overturn that incentive and encourage banks 
to cease their CRA activities in many communities that they now currently serve.   
 
Similarly, the single ratio test does not separately evaluate successful CRA activities under each 
of the three tests (lending, investment, and service).   Presumably, under the ratio, a bank that did 
$9 million in CRA investments would produce the same numerator as a bank that did $3 million 
each in CRA loans, investments, and services.  That would have the unfortunate effect of 
encouraging banks to take the easy route by loading up on big, splashy loans and investments to 
satisfy the numerator in the place of labor-intensive retail loans and deposit-taking services.  
Contrast that with the OCC’s current practice for small banks, in which a bank must meet or 
exceed the lending test in order for its community development investments and services to be 
considered for an outstanding rating.35 
 
Meanwhile, using a balance sheet measure such as total assets, deposits, or capital as the 
denominator has problems of its own.  Today, banks originate most of their loans and other 
credit receivables for distribution via securitization.  That allows them to remove those assets 
from their balance sheets.  Any metric in the denominator that is limited to the balance sheet will 
consequently understate most banks’ asset activities.  This would artificially inflate the CRA 
ratio and thereby allow banks to earn satisfactory or outstanding CRA ratings with less CRA 
activity than they need today.  
 
In another concern, the numeric benchmark approach would likely cause banks to do just enough 
qualifying CRA activities to hit their target benchmark and no more.  The ANPR suggests that 
numeric “thresholds or ranges (benchmarks) [would] correspond to the four statutory CRA rating 
categories.”36  It is well known that numeric benchmarks create an “anchoring effect,” by 
                                                 
33  12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(1)(B). 
34  Further, no mathematical weighting system could fix this problem.  Imagine, for example, that one 
assessment area received a weight of 1 and another assessment area that was ten times more populous received a 10.  
By increasing its qualifying CRA activities in the larger area, a bank could zero out its qualifying activities in the 
smaller area without reducing its ratio.  By failing to serve the smaller community, this would violate the intent of 
CRA. 
35  ANPR, supra note 1, at 45055. 
36  Id. at 45056. 
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effectively signaling a maximum that actors must attain in order to meet their obligations.  In this 
way as well, the single ratio approach would likely reduce the current level of CRA activity. 
 
Finally, the single ratio proposal raises a larger philosophical concern.  Specifically, do 
regulators, banks, and the public at large have enough insight into the convenience and needs of 
diverse communities from Alaska to Maine to set ex ante quantitative ratios for CRA 
performance?  Is certainty and mathematical precision worth the cost of losing local 
responsiveness and less CRA activity?  We firmly believe it is not.   
 
D. Consideration of Discrimination and Illegal Credit Practices in CRA Evaluations 
 
Traditionally, federal banking regulators have taken evidence of unlawful credit practices and 
illegal discrimination based on prohibited categories such as race or ethnicity into consideration 
in CRA evaluations and ratings.  There are strong historical and practical reasons for doing so 
and we urge the OCC to continue that practice in any prospective CRA examinations and CRA 
rule. 
 
To understand the importance of continuing this practice, some history is in order.  Congress 
enacted CRA against the backdrop of blatant housing and lending discrimination in the United 
States.37  Much of this discrimination had been sanctioned by the federal government.38    
Beginning in the late 1930s, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board and the Federal Housing 
Administration (AFHA@) had discouraged black entry into white neighborhoods by using race-
based appraisal standards in FHA underwriting guidelines for federally insured mortgages.39 The 
FHA did not eliminate race-based standards from its underwriting criteria until the 1960s, when 
it was required to do so by Executive Order 11,063 in 1962.40 
 
In addition, the FHA had required the use of racially restrictive covenants in all FHA-guaranteed 
real estate transactions, thereby perpetuating racial segregation and all-white enclaves.  This 
practice officially ended in 1947, but racially restrictive covenants remained on the books and 
bolstered racial segregation in housing for decades to come.41 
 
By the 1960s, the tragic consequences of officially sanctioned mortgage discrimination had 
become painfully apparent to Congress.  Middle-class whites, with the aid of federal subsidies 
for interstate highways, mortgage insurance and mortgage loans, had beaten a path to the 
suburbs, leaving poor blacks and other impoverished minorities to languish behind in inner-city 
ghettos.42  At the same time, lenders increasingly refused to make mortgages or small business 
loans in designated nonwhite communities, a notorious practice known as redlining.43  
 
                                                 
37  The following discussion is excerpted from MCCOY, supra note 16, § 8.04[1]. 
38  See Swire, supra note 17, at 793-99. 
39  FHA, UNDERWRITING MANUAL & 937 (1938) (quoted in Stephen M. Dane, Eliminating the Labyrinth: A 
Proposal to Simplify Federal Mortgage Lending Discrimination Laws, 26 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 527, 535 (1993)). 
40  3 C.F.R. § 652 (1959-63), reprinted as amended in 42 U.S.C. ' 1982.  See generally Dane, supra note 39, 
at 536, 539. 
41  See, e.g., Dane, supra note 39, at 535-36. 
42  See, e.g., Swire, supra note 17, at 798-99. 
43  See, e.g., Dane, supra note 39, at 536-37. 
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The deterioration of the inner city cores and urban unrest finally goaded Congress into action and 
caused it to enact a suite of federal laws which included CRA.  Congress took the first step to 
address redlining and discriminatory credit denials in 1968, when it prohibited discrimination in 
housing finance in Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act.44  The following decade, as urban 
neighborhoods continued to decline, Congress passed three more statutes, the Equal Credit 
Opportunity Act of 1974 (AECOA@),45 the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act of 1975,46 and CRA 
in 1977.  All four statutes were designed to address the twin ills of discrimination and 
disinvestment.   
 
When Congress enacted CRA, one of its two chief concerns was to end redlining.47  Although 
redlining mostly targeted LMI neighborhoods, historically, that redlining was motivated by racial 
and ethnic discrimination and was strongly correlated with ethnicity and race.48   Indeed, for this 
reason, redlining is not just a central concern of CRA but also violates the fair lending laws.49 As 
this demonstrates, CRA’s focus on LMI neighborhoods is inextricably linked to problems of 
unlawful housing and credit discrimination. 
 
In acknowledgment of this history, federal banking regulators adopted a joint interagency rule in 
2005 stating that “evidence of discriminatory or other illegal credit practices in any geography by 
the bank or in any assessment area by any affiliate whose loans have been considered as part of 
the bank's lending performance” will adversely affect a bank’s CRA evaluation.50  As part of 
their CRA evaluations, the OCC and the other federal regulators also prohibit banks from 
delineating assessment areas based on illegal discrimination.51  To carry out these regulations, 
whenever possible, the federal banking regulators conduct CRA examinations and fair lending 
examinations together in order to detect the presence of any discriminatory practices.52 
 
These antidiscrimination provisions in the CRA rule are highly important and we urge the OCC 
to retain them.  For all intents and purposes, positive CRA ratings are “Good Housekeeping” 
seals of approval by the federal government for good community reinvestment performance.  
Banks with satisfactory or outstanding CRA ratings can tout this federal imprimatur to the public 
and receive favorable handling in their applications for deposit facilities and for financial holding 
company status based on the public portion of their CRA examination reports.   
 
                                                 
44  Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-31).   
45  Pub. L. No. 93-495, 88 Stat. 1500, 1521-25 (1974) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f). 
46  Pub. L. No. 94-200, 89 Stat. 1124 (1975) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2810). 
47  See, e.g., Getter, supra note 20, at 1. 
48  See, e.g., Ben Horowitz, Fair lending laws and the CRA;  Complementary tools for increasing equitable 
access to credit (Fed. Res. Bank of Minneapolis, March 8, 2018). 
49  See id.  
50  See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 25.28(c)(1).  In its CRA examination of Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as of September 30, 
2012, for instance, the OCC gave Wells Fargo outstanding ratings on its lending and investment tests and a high 
satisfactory rating on its service test, yet an overall “needs to improve” CRA rating because of the bank’s lending 
discrimination settlements.  See OCC, Community Reinvestment Act Performance Evaluation as of September 30, 
2012:  Wells Fargo Bank, National Association 4, https://www.occ.treas.gov/topics/compliance-bsa/cra/2012-55-
wells-fargo-cra-evaluation.pdf 
51  See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 25.41(e)(2). 
52  For a general discussion of the symbiosis between fair lending examinations and CRA examinations, see 
Horowitz, supra note 48. 
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For this reason, CRA ratings require due diligence by federal banking regulators to rule out 
unlawful discrimination or credit law violations.  If a bank received a salutary CRA rating but 
was later to found to have engaged in unlawful discrimination or illegal credit practices, that 
would undermine CRA’s objectives.  Further, it would put federal banking regulators in the 
uncomfortable position of awarding CRA credits only to later to unearth unlawful discrimination 
or illegality at the bank in question.   For these reasons, the anti-discrimination provisions of the 
CRA rule are of vital importance and must be continued.   
 
E. The Importance of a Joint Interagency Rule 
 
Finally, we urge the OCC to redouble its efforts to promulgate a joint interagency rule with the 
Federal Reserve Board and the FDIC.  Going it alone would have several deleterious effects. 
 
First, separate rules for the OCC and the other two agencies would undermine one of the OCC’s 
own goals, which is to increase the certainty surrounding CRA evaluations.53  With warring 
standards, bank holding companies with state and federal depository institution charters would 
be subject to different CRA approaches, depending on the subsidiary.   Local governmental and 
non-profit institutions that partner with banks would similarly have enormous confusion about 
which CRA standards applied. 
 
Second, the ANPR does not consider the effect of separate CRA rules on merger application 
decisions by the Federal Reserve Board.  Numerous national banks owned by bank holding 
companies regularly engage in mergers.  In bank merger applications that also result in the 
merger of the parent holding companies, the Federal Reserve must evaluate whether convenience 
and needs would be served.54   We doubt that the Federal Reserve would abandon its own 
method for evaluating convenience and needs in merger applications and nothing in a separate 
OCC rule would prevent it from doing so.  In this additional way, two separate approaches to 
CRA compliance would confuse the marketplace and increase the uncertainty surrounding bank 
mergers and the conditions on those approvals. 
 
Lastly, if the OCC rejects a joint interagency approach, it will create an unlevel playing field for 
state-chartered banks and thrifts.  That is a dangerous path to tread, as the lead-up to the 2008 
financial crisis showed.55  We urge the OCC to work with its fellow regulators to find common 
ground and avoid that unfortunate outcome. 
 
----------------------------------- 
 
                                                 
53  While we appreciate that the flexibility of the current CRA rule engenders some uncertainty, that 
uncertainty does not hurt most banks’ CRA ratings.  Economist Darryl Getter reported, for instance, that each year 
from 2006 through 2014, approximately 97% or more of banks received CRA ratings of satisfactory or higher.  
Getter, supra note 20, at 9.  If anything, this “Lake Woebegone” effect suggests that CRA standards need to be 
tightened, not loosened, as the single ratio proposal would potentially do. 
54  12 U.S.C. § 1842(c)(2) (“In every case, the Board shall take into consideration the financial and managerial 
resources and future prospects of the company or companies and the banks concerned, and the convenience and 
needs of the community to be served”).. 
55  See generally KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS:  RECKLESS CREDIT, 
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
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